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Abstract. The increasing interest in physically unclonable functions or
PUFs and in PUF-based security applications desires a concrete and as
formal as possible description of what a PUF is and which properties can
be naturally expected. However, the wide and growing variety of different
PUF and PUF-like proposals makes such a formalization attempt a non-
trivial task. In this work we provide a starting point by developing a
concrete, though still informal, description of the minimal requirements a
construction needs to meet in order to be called a PUF. Additionally, this
study gives an insight into attainable and/or desirable PUF properties
and reveals some interesting research directions for future investigation.
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1 Introduction
The formal introduction of the PUF concept, first as physical one-way func-
tions [1], physical random functions [2] and eventually as physical(ly) unclonable
functions was done in the beginning of the twenty first century, although some
similar and equivalent ideas were introduced much earlier [3,4,5]. Following this
introduction, an increasing number of new types of PUFs were proposed, with
a tendency towards more integrated constructions. The practical relevance of
PUFs for security applications was recognized from the start, with a special fo-
cus on the promising properties of physical unclonability and tamper evidence.
Over the last couple of years, the interest in PUFs has risen substantially, making
them a hot topic in the field of hardware security and leading to an expansion
of published results.
There exists a widely accepted notion of which constructions we classify as
PUFs (or PUF-like) and which not, but coming up with an appropriate and
correct formal translation turns out to be harder as expected. A number of
earlier PUF-defining attempts fail to completely capture this notion, either by
only restricting themselves to a subclass of PUFs through the introduction of
too stringent assumptions, or by not being strict enough and allowing clearly
non-PUF constructions. On the other hand, in order to develop PUF-based ap-
plications, a correct formalization is highly desirable as a basis for demonstrating
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strong security notions. Especially for the recently introduced topic of hardware
entangled cryptography [6], a formal PUF model seems inevitable.
In this work, we make a start at defining what we understand to be a PUF.
We don’t yet provide a highly formal description and we certainly do not claim
to have found the one-and-only correct PUF definition, but in stead we identify
a number of properties which recur in different works on PUFs. By checking
these properties for a representative set of PUF proposals and a number of non-
PUF reference cases, we propose a least common subset of properties which
distinguish PUFs from other primitives. The best way to get a feeling of the
accepted notion what a PUF is, we give a brief overview of many different PUF
proposals in Sect. 2. Recurring PUF properties are described and checked in
Sect. 3 and the PUF-defining properties are identified. In Sect. 4, the main
results from this property comparison are discussed and evaluated and a number
of critical remarks are made. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 5.
2 Physically Unclonable Functions
2.1 PUF Basics
We start by describing a PUF as a physical challenge-response procedure. Note
that there are already a number of subtleties in this description, i.e. a PUF is not
a purely abstract mathematical concept but is (embedded in) a physical entity,
and a PUF is a procedure with some input-output functionality although not
necessarily a function in the strict mathematical sense. The inputs to a PUF
are generally called challenges and we denote them as x ∈ X and the outputs
are called responses, y ∈ Y. An applied challenge and its measured response
are generally called a challenge-response pair or CRP (x, y) and a particular
PUF is completely described by the relation it enforces between challenges and
responses and is referred to as its CRP behavior, Π : X → Y : Π(x) = y.
The fundamental application of PUFs comes from their identification ability.
To that end, the concept of inter- versus intra-(class) distances was inherited
from the theory about classification and identification. For a set of instantiations
of a particular PUF construction, inter- and intra-distances are calculated as
follows:
– The desired properties of uniqueness and unclonability should result in sub-
stantially different responses to the same challenge for a pair of distinct
PUF instances. For a particular challenge, the inter-distance between two
PUFs is the distance between the two responses resulting from applying this
challenge once to both PUFs.
– Noise, measurement uncertainty and external influence often undesirably
but inevitably affect the exact value of a PUF’s response. For a particular
challenge, the intra-distance between two evaluations on one single PUF in-
stantiation is the distance between the two responses resulting from applying
this challenge twice to one PUF.
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We stress that both inter- and intra-distance are measured on a pair of re-
sponses resulting from the same challenge. For a particular type of PUF, the
inter- and intra-distance characteristics are often summarized by providing his-
tograms showing the occurrence of both distances, observed over a number of
different challenges and a number of different pairs PUFs. A much-used indicator
for both measures are their average values over many PUF pairs and many ap-
plied challenges, µinter for inter-distance and µintra for intra-distance. Desirable
PUF behavior is an as small as possible µintra, with µinter as close as possible to
50%, e.g. in case of bit vector responses we would like the responses to the same
challenge on different PUFs to differ on average for half of the bits.
2.2 PUF and PUF-like Implementations
Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of different PUF or PUF-like
constructions have been proposed. We discuss a number of them in more detail
and provide many references to similar proposals.
Optical PUFs were originally introduces as physical one-way functions in [1],
which is the first attempt to formally describe the PUF concept in cryptograph-
ical terms, i.c. as a physical variant of one-way functions. The core component
of an optical PUF is a small transparent token randomly doped with optical
scattering particles. When radiated with a laser a complex image with bright
and dark spots arises, a so-called speckle pattern. A Gabor filter turns out to be
a good feature extractor for such a pattern and the filter output is the response
of the optical PUF, while the physical parameters of the laser (location, orienta-
tion, wave length,. . . ) are considered the challenge. Due to the complex nature
of the interaction of the laser light with the scattering particles, the responses
are highly random and unique. The high dependence of the response on the
exact (sub-)microscopic physical details of the optical token causes two equally
produced tokens to show a radically different CRP behavior and moreover pre-
vents a particular token from being cloned with high precision. Additionally,
it was demonstrated that a small physical change to the token, e.g. drilling a
microscopic hole, changes the CRP behavior substantially, i.e. the tokens show
some form of tamper evidence to invasive attacks. A similar approach towards
constructing unclonable optical tokens, based on reflective instead of transparent
media, was proposed much earlier in [4].
Coating PUFs [7] attempt to integrate the PUF functionality on an inte-
grated circuit (IC). A special coating is sprayed on top of an IC, containing
small and random dielectric particles. Capacitive sensors in the top metal layer
of the IC measure the random capacitances caused by the dielectric. As with
the optical PUF, the CRP behavior of a coating PUF is highly dependent on
the randomized sub-micron details of the coating and is hence to a large extent
unique and unclonable. Tamper evidence was also experimentally verified and
since the coating resides in the top layer of the IC, this property can be used
to make the whole IC tamper evident. PUF(-like) proposals based on similar or
slightly different concepts were described in [8] as LC-PUFs and in [9] as RF-
DNA.
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Intrinsic PUFs are in fact a class of PUF proposals with two additional con-
struction requirements. Firstly, the complete PUF including the measurement
equipment should be fully integrated in the embedding device using the PUF,
and secondly, this integration can be completely performed using the standard
manufacturing flow of the device, i.e. without the need for PUF-specific pro-
cessing steps or components. It is clear that intrinsic PUFs possibly offer higher
security conditions whilst being more cost-effective to implement. A number of
intrinsic PUF constructions, all based on digital integrated circuits, have been
proposed. The key operation principle for all of them is that they use the in-
evitable random manufacturing variability between equally produced ICs. This
use of the intrinsic randomness in the devices avoids a possibly costly explicit
introduction of randomness.
A first type of intrinsic PUFs on digital ICs are based on the variability in the
delay of a digital signal. Arbiter PUFs [10] implement two symmetrical digital
delay paths on an IC. A challenge controls the exact delay setting of the lines,
and a race condition is introduced by feeding a pulse simultaneously on both. A
so-called arbiter circuit determines which of both paths was the fastest and out-
puts a bit accordingly. Ring oscillator PUFs [2] are also based on digital delays,
but transform them into oscillators by using negative feedback. By measuring
the oscillations, a measure for the delay is obtained. Both constructions were
implemented and tested on integrated circuits and show a nice PUF behavior.
However, it was immediately recognized that due to the specific linear construc-
tion of the delay circuit, both PUFs are susceptible to model-building attacks, i.e.
after observing a relatively small number of CRPs from a PUF, the remaining
unseen CRPs can be predicted with high accuracy by modeling the delay paths.
To overcome this problem, a number of non-linear variants for arbiter PUFs
were proposed [10,11,12], but improved modeling techniques [13] have shown
that these constructions are also not immune to prediction. For ring oscillator
PUFs, a proposed construction based on differential measurements [11] is appar-
ently secure against model-building, but this comes at a large implementation
overhead compared to the original construction.
Another type of digital intrinsic PUFs use the effect of manufacturing vari-
ability on the settling state of some memory cell constructions. There are a
number of ways for constructing digital memories and a much-used method is
using cross-coupled gates. By cross-coupling two gates, e.g. two inverters, a log-
ical cell is constructed which can assume two distinct but logically stable states,
and by residing in one of both the cell can effectively store one binary digit. This
is typically the case for SRAM memories (two cross-coupled inverters), latches
(two cross-coupled NAND or NOR gates) and flip-flops. If a logically unstable
state is introduced in such a cell, it is not clear to which of both stable states it
will converge. As it turns out, the tendency of a particular cell towards one or
the other stable state is determined by the slight random subtleties caused by
manufacturing variability. This settling state is hence random and unique for a
particular device and can be used as a PUF response. SRAM PUFs [14,15] and
flip-flop PUFs [16] are constructed by observing the settling state of an SRAM
4
cell or a flip-flop after the implicit instability caused by a power-up of the de-
vice. Latch PUFs [17] and butterfly PUFs [18] observe the stabilizing state after
a cell has explicitly been destabilized. In all cases, the challenge to the PUF
is the address of a particular cell, with the cell’s stabilizing state acting as the
response.
Other proposals. For completeness, we provide a very brief overview of other
concrete PUF(-like) constructions known to us. A number of proposals for iden-
tifying documents and packagings based on measurements of the random ar-
rangement of (paper) fibers were proposed over time [3,5,19,20]. In [21], it was
observed that manufacturing variability also affects the precise length of lands
and pits on a compact disc and that this can be used to extract a CD fingerprint.
So-called magnetic PUFs [22] use the inherent uniqueness of particle patterns in
magnetic media and can be used as a unique identifier for magnetic swipe cards.
Identification of acoustical delay lines based on instance specific details caused
by manufacturing variability was studied in [23]. Two PUFs based on analog
measurements of electrical parameters on an IC were proposed in [24] (threshold
voltages) and in [25] (resistances).
3 Properties of PUFs
3.1 Property Description
We begin by listing eight regularly occurring properties identified from multiple
attempted PUF definitions and give a concise but accurate description of what
we mean by them, in order to avoid ambiguity in this and future works. We
immediately note that these are not completely formal properties, but a hint
towards a more formal description is given. In fact, the informal parts of the
property descriptions are clearly marked in sans-serif font.
1. Evaluatable: given Π and x, it is easy to evaluate y = Π(x). Easy can mean
different things. From a theoretical point of view it can mean in polynomial
time and resources, while in practice it can mean at a very low cost overhead.
2. Unique: Π(x) contains some information about the identity of the physi-
cal entity embedding Π. This means that, in theory, a set of CRPs from a
particular PUF suffices to uniquely identify that PUF in a given population.
3. Reproducible: y = Π(x) is reproducible up to a small error. The error needs
to be small in the considered distance metric. This property distinguishes
PUFs from true random number generators (TRNGs).
4. Physically unclonable: given Π, it is hard to construct a physical entity con-
taining another PUF ΠΓ 6= Π such that ∀x ∈ X : ΠΓ(x) ≈ Π(x) up to a small
error. The hardness of producing a physical clone even holds for the manufac-
turer of the original PUF Π and is for that reason also called manufacturer
resistance. Note that physical unclonability implies uniqueness.
5. Mathematically unclonable: given Π, it is hard to construct an (abstract)
mathematical procedure fΓ such that ∀x ∈ X : fΓ(x) ≈ Π(x) up to a small
error.
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6. Unpredictable: given only a set Q = {(xi, yi = Π(xi))}, i = 1 . . . q, it is hard
to predict Π(xc) up to a small error with xc a random challenge such that
(xc, ·) /∈ Q. Note that unpredictability is a relaxed form of mathematical
unclonability, i.e. mathematical unclonability implies unpredictability.
7. One-way: given only y and Π, it is hard to find x ∈ X such that Π(x) = y.
8. Tamper evident: altering the physical entity embedding Π transforms Π→ Π′
such that with high probability ∃x ∈ X : Π(x) 6= Π′(x), not even up to a
small error. This means that an invasive tampering attack on the PUF leaves
indelible traces in the CRP behavior.
Note that we explicitly distinguish between physical and mathematical unclon-
ability since a construction can be easy to clone physically but not mathemati-
cally or vice versa. In order to be truly unclonable, Π needs to be both physically
and mathematically unclonable.
3.2 Property Check
Now we will check these properties for a representative set of PUF constructions.
The proposals we consider are basically all proposed digital intrinsic PUFs for
which concrete implementation details are available, and two well studied non-
intrinsic PUFs. To draw some sensible conclusions, we have to compare these
PUF proposals with some non-PUF reference cases. We check against the fol-
lowing three reference cases which we describe in a challenge-response-like style
for easy comparison with PUFs:
– A true random number generator. The single challenge is the request for a
random number. The response is a random number extracted from a stochas-
tical physical process.
– A very simple RFID-like identification protocol. The single challenge is the
request for identification. The response is an identifier string which was hard-
programmed in the device by the manufacturer.
– A public key signature scheme. A challenge is a message string. A response
is signature on that message generated using a private key which was hard-
programmed by the device manufacturer.
The result of this study is shown in matrix format in Table 1.
3.3 PUF-defining Properties
From Table 1 it is clear that the first four properties, i.e. evaluatable, unique,
reproducible and physically unclonable, are positive (
√
) for all PUF propos-
als, while they completely distinguish them from the non-PUF reference cases.
Since uniqueness is implied by physical unclonability, we could say that the set
{evaluatable, reproducible, physically unclonable} is the least common property
subset of every PUF proposal up to date, and hence can in practice be con-
sidered a definition. Being evaluatable is merely a practicality constraint and
reproducibility is required to distinguish PUFs from TRNGs. The key defining
property of PUFs turns out to be physical unclonability, which nicely elucidates
the name physically unclonable functions.
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Table 1. Property matrix of different PUF proposals.
√
= proposal meets the
property. × = proposal does not meet the property. ! = proposal meets the
property under certain conditions. ? = it remains untested whether the proposal
meets the property.
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Evaluatable
√1 √1 √ √ √ √2 √ √ √ √
Unique
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
!3 !3
Reproducible
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ × √ √
Physically Unclonable
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ×4 ×4
Mathematically Unclonable
√ ×5 ×6 ×6 ×5 ×5 ×5 √ ×7 ×7
Unpredictable
√ √
!8 !8
√ √ √ √9 × √
One-way ? ×10 ×11 ? ×11 ×11 ×11 × × ?
Tamper Evident
√ √
? ? ? ? ? ? ×12 ×12
1. Requires extra manufacturing steps and/or external measurement equip-
ment.
2. Requires device power-up.
3. Requires explicit hard-programming of unique identifier or key.
4. Physically cloning a hard-programmed identifier or key is easy.
5. For these PUFs, a mathematical clone can be easily created by exhaustively
reading out every CRP.
6. For these PUFs, a mathematical clone can be created by a model-building
attack.
7. An adversary who knows the identifier/private key can easily forge a valid
identification/signature.
8. These PUFs become increasingly easier to predict when an adversary learns
more CRPs.
9. Unpredictability is a key requirement for a good TRNG.
10. Because these PUFs have so few challenges, a random challenge will with
non-negligible probability invert a PUF response.
11. Because the output of these PUFs is basically one bit, a random challenge
will with probability ≈ 50% invert a PUF response.
12. If there is no additional tamper protection provided, hard-programmed
identifiers and keys are not tamper evident.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Unattainable Properties for Bare PUFs
Unpredictability is a necessary condition for many PUF applications, but it turns
out that it is not always achievable for every PUF. Mathematical unclonability
is even harder to obtain and up to now only the optical PUF meets this property
up to some extent. However, the mathematical unclonability, and by implication
the unpredictability of these bare PUFs can be greatly improved by turning
them into controlled PUFs[26] (CPUFs), which is a mode of operation for a
PUF in combination with other (cryptographic) primitives. A PUF is said to be
controlled if it can only be accessed via an algorithm which is physically bound to
the PUF in an inseparable way. Attempting to break the link between the PUF
and the access algorithm should preferably lead to the destruction of the PUF.
A CPUF can obfuscate the connection between its responses and the physical
details of the PUF, or slow down full read-out, making mathematical cloning
more difficult. It is clear that turning a PUF into a CPUF greatly increases the
security, but it must be stressed that this enhanced security strongly depends on
the physical linking of the PUF with the access algorithm. The exact practical
and security details of this strong link are not completely clear and more research
is required.
One-wayness does not seem to be a good property for bare PUFs since not
one proposal was effectively shown to be one-way, and most are not. CPUFs
might offer a form of one-wayness, however it will be based on the strength of
its cryptographic primitives in stead of on the used PUF.
Regarding tamper evidence, which is considered a key PUF property in some
works, there is much uncertainty due to a lack of experimental verification. Up to
now, tamper evident characteristics were only empirically demonstrated for the
(non-intrinsic) optical [1] and coating PUFs [7]. Future investigations showing
either positive or negative results concerning the tamper evidence of intrinsic
PUFs will be of great value.
4.2 Formalization of PUF Properties
In order to make strong claims on the security of PUFs and PUF applications,
it is necessary to come up with a formalized version of the property descriptions
in Sect. 3. This formalization will act as a convenient interface between the peo-
ple involved in the practical implementation of a physically unclonable function
and the people designing PUF-based security primitives and applications. We
acknowledge that for some of the properties, coming up with a formal definition
is far from trivial. Especially the more practical ones, i.e. physical unclonability
and tamper evidence, will be hard to fit into a theoretical framework. Moreover,
even from a practical point of view it is not yet exactly clear what these prop-
erties stand for. As already discussed, for tamper evidence further experiments
on intrinsic PUFs are highly recommended in order to get a better feeling of
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its feasibility. Physical unclonability, although considered to be the key prop-
erty of PUFs, is for the moment a rather ad-hoc assumption primarily based
on the apparent hardness of measuring and controlling random effects during
manufacturing processes. However, for a number of intrinsic PUF proposals, it
is not clear how realistic this assumption is. Further research into these topics
is definitely required.
4.3 A Note on Mathematical Unclonability
We already stated that mathematical unclonability is unattainable for all bare
intrinsic PUF proposals up to date, either due to the susceptibility to model-
building attacks, or due to the small number of available CRPs which allows
for a full read-out of the PUF. It is not clear whether this restriction is a sign
of an underlying physical bound on the number of unpredictable CRPs which
is obtainable for any intrinsic PUF, or whether this is merely a result of the
particular PUF constructions which have been proposed thus far. The following
open question can be stated: “Is it possible to construct an intrinsic PUF with
1) a very large (exponential?) number of CRPs, for which 2) it is practically
infeasible to build and execute a model predicting unknown responses based on
observed CRPs?”.
5 Conclusion
Through a brief but concise overview of a representative set of PUF proposals
from literature, both intrinsic and non-intrinsic, we tried to carry across the
notion of which constructions we naturally identify to be PUFs, and which not.
In an attempt to capture this notion in a concrete description, we establish a
number of clear-cut but still informal properties and check the different construc-
tions against them. After this study, we were able to identify the least common
subset of properties which distinguishes all PUFs from a number of considered
non-PUF reference cases. As it turns out, and as is nicely put forward by its
naming, the key property of PUFs is physical unclonability. Additionally, this
comparative study exposes some gaps and open questions in our knowledge of
PUFs, both on a practical and a theoretical level. We discussed some of these
topics which could lead to very interesting future investigations.
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